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INTRODUCTION 
As national governments relinquish some of their functions, governments of cities 
around the globe are expected to act in a corporate manner to compete with other 
cities (Harvey 1989; Sager 2011). As economic orthodoxy posits that economic 
openness and liberalization are desirable steps towards economic development, the 
focus of much national and international policy has turned to those cities where 
economic output and population are increasingly concentrated. Policy prescriptions 
seek to prepare cities to attract foreign investment by, among others, making them 
more amenable to an international elite, easing local regulations, providing 
infrastructure and incentives, and generally creating a modern image by resorting to 
an accepted international language of architectural aspiration and urban prosperity 
(Cuadrado-Roura and Fernández Güell 2008; Rossi and Vanolo 2012). 
 
Central to these policy prescriptions are the notions of globalization and ‘good urban 
governance’. The World Bank advanced the idea of ‘good urban governance’ in the 
early 2000s as a central tenet in its pledge to help ensure ‘a decent quality of life and 
equitable opportunities for all residents, including the poorest’ and, in its own words, 
make cities livable (2000: 8). Compared to the 1990s and 2000s, the World Bank’s 
current influence over national government policies as measured by the volume of 
loans it is able to disburse appears considerably diminished, especially in relation to 
foreign direct investment and overseas remittances. And yet, up to the early 2000s, 
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the World Bank’s influence on the nature and direction of policies of national 
governments that needed to borrow from it was virtually undisputed. In the 1980s and 
1990s this institution lay behind many of the major reforms of the state embodied in 
Structural Adjustment policies mainly in low and middle-income nations to which it 
made conditional loans (Mohan et al. 1999; Craig and Porter 2006). As the legacy of 
Structural Adjustment persists in the endurance of such policy prescriptions, it is 
pertinent to examine the nature and reach of what became an influential set of policies 
particularly at the city scale.  
 
This chapter examines the World Bank’s position on ‘good urban governance’ and its 
promotion of urban competitiveness within a framework of globalization, and sets this 
against a set of recent urban interventions in the city of Medellin, Colombia’s second 
largest city. The case of Medellin is a valuable one to examine, not simply because it 
has been largely under-documented internationally, but also because it has been 
severely marked in recent decades by acute problems of violence, poverty, a large 
informal economy, and growing social and spatial fragmentation that in many ways 
are typical of other cities in Latin America.  
 
Medellin in the 2000s offers an example of a range of institutionally and politically 
bold social and economic policies that stand in stark contrast with the free market 
policies espoused by Colombia’s national government in the 1990s (Bateman et al. 
2011). The chapter shows that in a context of unusually high levels of violence and 
social malaise, successive local governments in Medellin had no option but to fill 
major gaps in access to infrastructure and improve the well being of poor and highly 
marginalized urban communities. Whilst espousing a competitiveness and 
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liberalization discourse to attract foreign investment that might appear to point to a set 
of free-market policies, in practice these governments actively intervened by investing 
heavily in urban infrastructure to benefit marginalized communities while 
strengthening local democratic practices. Medellin is unusual in that it not only 
devoted considerable investment towards upgrading informal settlements and 
connecting their residents to the formal city, but it was also able to draw on a set of 
robust municipal institutions and national and local revenues as well other local 
resources that few municipal governments of its size in the global south are able to 
secure. 
 
The next section examines firstly, the arguments supporting reforms of the national 
state that dominated much of the mainstream political discourse in Latin America in 
the 1980s and 1990s and secondly, the notion of ‘good urban governance’ as outlined 
by the World Bank. The third section presents the case study of Medellin, mainly 
focusing on the major investments in transport and physical upgrading of 
marginalized urban communities of the past decade, as well as on the city 
governments’ search for greater competitiveness. A final section concludes.  
 
‘GOOD URBAN GOVERNANCE’ 
The 1980s saw major shifts both in the nature of the state and how influential decision 
makers in the international arena perceived it. The state had been seen as a crucial 
factor and central component of the process of economic and social development 
since the 1930s, when the world economy suffered major setbacks resulting from the 
Great Depression. This central function began to be questioned some decades later. 
The arguments of major thinkers advocating a reduced role of the state in the national 
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economy like Hayek in the 1940s, and later Buchanan, Friedman, Balassa, Lal, and 
Little in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, are well known (Hunt 1989).  
 
The process of reduction in the size of the state and deregulation of the market that 
unfolded at a global scale has been variously described and analyzed from a range of 
ideological and epistemological angles. Of interest here is what this involved in terms 
of contestation, malleability and reconstitution of the state in its different scales 
(Brenner 2004; 2009; Swyngedouw 2005), and in particular what this entailed for the 
city level, the scale at which it is more able to directly influence people’s quality of 
life and their sense of order and security (Maragall 1997).  
 
Bresser Pereira (1999) refers to the state that started to appear since the 1930s in the 
industrialized countries as ‘social-bureaucratic’, whose main function was to 
guarantee social rights and full employment by directly employing a mass of 
bureaucrats. For this scholar and politician (who was minister for state reform under 
President Cardoso of Brazil in the 1990s), while the crisis of the 1930s was a crisis of 
the market, what emerged in the 1980s was a crisis of the state. After two decades of 
unprecedented economic growth and unparalleled improvements in living standards, 
industrialized countries underwent two decades of slower economic growth, increased 
unemployment, inflation, a growing fiscal gap, and increasing fiscal difficulties. 
 
In the decades prior to 1980, the state in Latin America had also played a central role 
in guiding development, through interventionist policies and protection to infant 
manufacturing industries, giving rise to rapid economic growth. However, the region 
was not able to escape the fiscal crisis of the 1980s. The exhaustion of import 
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substitution industrialization policies launched in previous decades was accompanied 
by high inflation levels, increasing levels of private and public debt resulting from the 
high price of petrol and abundance of cheap petro-dollars in the 1970s (Kalmanovitz 
2001). This was made worse by pressure on national economies arising from 
globalization, facilitated by technological advances (especially in 
telecommunications), low prices of energy for transporting trade merchandise (which 
even today fail to take into account the high price embodied in climate change as a 
result of fossil fuel emissions), and the rapid rise in international trade especially by 
multinational companies, key winners in the struggle to lift measures that protect 
national industries (Biel 2000).  
 
According to Bresser Pereira (1999: 12), the crisis of the state resulted from ‘the fact 
that, once it grew beyond a certain size, and due to its loss of autonomy resulting from 
globalization, the State had often been captured by private interests’. So, ‘by growing 
too much and losing functionality’, the social-bureaucratic state ‘instead of being a 
factor impelling development began to dampen it’ (1999: 9). This led to a consensus 
among governments to the right of the political spectrum, such as Pinochet’s 
government in Chile and later Thatcher’s and Reagan’s in the UK and the US, 
respectively, to open national economies and actively seek to reform the state in what 
came to be known as ‘the Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 2004). International 
aid agencies have been central actors in this process, by acting as transmission 
mechanisms of ideas about state reform in the most distant locations in the planet.  
 
The World Bank (along with its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund) 
made reform a pre-condition for disbursing loans. Although the impact of state reform 
  6 
in Latin America was not as socially devastating as in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
levels of unemployment and informality increased exponentially, the Bank’s 
influence in the way the state was to be redefined was nonetheless decisive, not 
merely at the national scale, but also at the sub-national and particularly the urban 
scale. In Zetter’s view (2004), because the urban scale concentrates a large and 
growing proportion of output and consumption, it becomes a fulcrum for the 
articulation of the national and global economies. This is the reason why state reforms 
seek to integrate more effectively cities to the global economy. Reform was also 
central to the policies of other international aid agencies including bilateral (such as 
the UK Government’s Department for International Development) and multi-lateral 
ones (such as the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and UN-
Habitat). 
 
It is within this context that the notion of urban ‘good governance’ was coined. 
According to the World Bank’s strategy for the urban sector and local governments, 
good governance ‘implies inclusion and representation of all groups in the urban 
society - and accountability, integrity, and transparency of local government actions - 
in defining and pursuing shared goals’ (2000: 10). Cities must be livable, ‘ensuring 
that the poor achieve a healthful and dignified living standard that permits them to 
share the resources of society’ (2000: 8). To achieve this, cities must be competitive, 
well governed and managed, and be financially sustainable.  
 
In a competitive city, according to the World Bank, city output, investment, 
employment and trade respond dynamically to market opportunities (2000: 48; see 
also World Bank 1991). Under such conditions benefits from urban agglomeration are 
  7 
maximized and diseconomies (from congestion and pollution, for example) 
minimized. An excess of regulations and fragmented infrastructure systems create 
additional transaction costs that are particularly harmful to small firms, ‘a significant 
source of employment and entrepreneurial energy’ (2000: 48). Those cities able to 
support firms so as to maximize their economic potential and weathering adverse 
developments ‘also provide a good platform for workers - by offering flexible labor 
markets, efficient services, and good education and training’ (2000: 49). 
 
In addition to good governance, a livable and competitive city also requires capable 
urban management. This refers to ‘the capacity to fulfill public responsibilities, with 
knowledge, skills, resources, and procedures that draw appropriately on partnerships’ 
(World Bank 2000: 49). A constant and formal interaction between local government 
and residents (including NGOs and community organizations) should be an important 
component of the Bank’s Urban Agenda programs. 
 
The third dimension contributing to a livable city is financial sustainability or 
bankability. However, it must be noted that city governments become credit worthy in 
the eyes of international financial institutions only when they are able to demonstrate 
a solid resource base and regular revenue flows. Up to that point, only national 
governments are eligible for sovereign loans. This shift reflects not only the new 
responsibilities that municipalities have been given by central governments, but also 
their growing role as mechanisms of transmission between national and global capital 
as described earlier. And yet, many cities lack the economic vigor and financial 
capacity to access capital markets, as this requires expenditure management, revenue 
mobilization and cost recovery, predictable inter-governmental transfers, good 
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financial administration, and prudent conditions for taking on loans. For the World 
Bank, one channel for enlarging the fiscal base of municipalities in the global south in 
particular is ‘to integrate informal and marginal communities as full urban citizens, 
taxpayers, and service customers’ (2000: 51). 
 
In a separate exercise, the World Bank has explored how cities perform under 
different conditions of openness to the global economy and governance arrangements. 
Using large data sets from 400 cities both in wealthier (OECD) and less developed 
countries, it set out to measure the extent to which these are linked (Léautier 2006: X) 
and found that ‘good governance and globalization tend to improve city-level 
performance in both the access to services as well as the quality of delivery of 
services which allows cities to translate global opportunity into local value for their 
citizens’. 
 
In this study ‘governance’ was measured through three variables, one national and 
two at the city level: ‘control of corruption’ by national government, ‘bribery in 
utility’ (the extent to which firms pay a bribe to gain access to utility services at the 
city scale), and ‘state capture’ (the extent to which some firms make illegal payments 
to the local government thus reducing competition). ‘City performance’ is measured 
using standard variables of access to basic infrastructure services (water, sewerage, 
electricity and telephones). ‘Globalization’, the second factor that in the study 
hypotheses impinges on city-level performance, is measured at the country level using 
a composite of international political engagement (participation in United Nations, 
number of embassies, etc.), internet penetration, degree of personal interaction 
internationally, and economic integration into the global economy (Léautier 2006: 5).  
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Notwithstanding the methodological concerns one might have about such variables, 
such an exercise merits attention insofar as it seeks to capture, in broad terms, a range 
of associations between categories that are used by a hegemonic ideological 
framework that continuously pushes city governments in the direction of opening up 
their economies to compete with each other in attracting international capital. As 
Medellin is not exempt from such pressures it is relevant to examine the extent to 
which such analytical framework fits with the city’s reality. 
 
The next section examines the extent to which these notions are of value in 
interpreting the case of Medellin. In particular, it seeks to examine the degree of 
association between globalization, governance and city performance as posited in the 
World Bank documents. The section also seeks to highlight the increased importance 
of Medellin’s local government as a central actor in local development, particularly in 
its contribution to reducing fragmentation of local infrastructure.  
 
MEDELLIN: THE SEARCH FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
If any city can be said to be media-conscious it is Medellin, for several decades of the 
20th century Colombia’s main manufacturing center. Testament to this is one of its 
most recent international accolades as ‘innovative city of the year’ beating 199 
contenders on the way, including New York and Tel Aviv, the other two finalists. The 
official website of the prize (Wall Street Journal 2013) summarizes the city’s 
achievements thus: 
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Few cities have transformed the way that Medellín, Colombia’s second largest 
city, has in the past 20 years. Medellín’s homicide rate has plunged, nearly 
80% from 1991 to 2010. The city built public libraries, parks, and schools in 
poor hillside neighborhoods and constructed a series of transportation links 
from there to its commercial and industrial centers. The links include a metro 
cable car system and escalators up steep hills, reducing commutation times, 
spurring private investment, and promoting social equity as well as 
environmental sustainability. In 2012, the Institute for Transportation and 
Development Policy recognized Medellín’s efforts with the Sustainable 
Transportation Award. 
 
But a change in the institutional fabric of the city may be as important as the 
tangible infrastructure projects. The local government, along with businesses, 
community organizations, and universities worked together to fight violence 
and to modernize Medellín. Transportation projects are financed through 
public-private partnerships; engineering firms have designed public buildings 
for free; and in 2006, nine of the city’s largest firms funded a science museum. 
In addition, Medellín is one of the largest cities to successfully implement 
participatory budgeting, which allows citizens to define priorities and allocate 
a portion of the municipal budget. Community organizations, health centers, 
and youth groups have formed, empowering citizens to declare ownership of 
their neighborhoods. 
 
Medellín’s challenges are still many, particularly in housing. However, 
through innovation and leadership, Medellín has sowed the seeds of 
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transformation, leading to its recognition as a city with potential for long-
lasting success. 
 
Although some hype might be expected from what is largely a marketing exercise by 
international commercial companies, independent academic research on these changes 
particularly in some of the city’s informal settlements (Dávila 2013; Brand and Dávila 
2011) confirms the veracity of much of this.  
 
How did Medellin ‘remake’ itself? By the early 1990s the city had gained 
international notoriety from the violence between rival gangs seeking to control a 
booming export market of illegal drugs (mainly cocaine) to the US and Europe 
(Hylton 2007). A linked high homicide rate resulted partly from the high levels of 
unemployment brought about by economic liberalization that hit the city’s textile and 
garment producers and the readiness of unemployed youth in poor neighborhoods to 
take up paid jobs with the drug gangs (Brand 2005). With no significant supply of 
social housing to meet the demand of a rapidly growing population of rural migrants, 
from the 1940s onwards the steep hills east of the traditional city center and 
eventually both sides of the Medellin River, provided a precarious but affordable 
location for improvised shacks in land squatted upon or bought from illegal land 
developers. Poverty has been an enduring and harsh reality in these and other rapidly 
growing informal settlements that extend above the long valley where much of the 
‘formal’ city lies. Occupying less than a quarter of the city’s area, informal 
settlements nonetheless housed over half of its population, many of whom rent the 
property they live in. Demolitions and evictions from these precarious locations by 
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the police became the norm, with the municipality unable or unwilling to provide 
affordable alternatives (Bahl 2012).  
 
The city’s manufacturing industry (which never quite graduated from light consumer 
to capital goods), protected for decades by policies of import substitution 
industrialization and largely geared to a domestic consumer market, was unable to 
weather the winds of liberalization. This plunged the mass of workers into long-term 
unemployment and poverty. With the appearance of the international drug trade as an 
alternative source of income, some of the poorest areas in this city of 3.5 million 
inhabitants fell under the control of local gangs and became inaccessible even for the 
local police. The city became increasingly fragmented, with the upper and middle-
classes withdrawing to enclosed, guarded spaces, while the city’s squares and the 
inner city became the territory of street vendors, the homeless, and armed gangs. 
Right-wing paramilitaries fought for control of informal settlements with left-wing 
militias.  
 
Gradually the city’s political class, intellectuals, community groups and activists 
reached a consensus on the need to find solutions to the city’s intractable social 
problems. The control and reclamation of public spaces were seen as effective 
deterrents to violence and crime (Stienen 2009; Medellin-IDB 2009). In this, the city 
government was able to build on Colombia’s new national political Constitution of 
1991 that gave the state the role to protect public space for collective use over private 
interests. It also built on the precedent of a strong defense of public space made by 
mayor Enrique Peñalosa in Bogota, Colombia’s capital city, in the late 1990s (Dávila 
2004). That this often meant an official perception of informal street vendors and the 
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homeless as undesirables who had to be removed is an issue that divided public 
opinion in Medellin (Stienen 2009). But it also chimed with the World Bank’s 
aforementioned notion that a city’s bankability necessitates integrating informal and 
marginal communities as full urban citizens, taxpayers, and service customers. 
 
During its construction in the early 1990s, the Metro was responsible for upgrading 
public spaces along its main line, by imposing a common template and an 
architectural language of frugality and order, arguing that uniformity helped people 
identify such spaces with the ‘Metro Culture’, its system of tight rules of behavior 
(Stienen 2009: 125). Implicit in this was an idealized vision of the city’s industrial 
past of the 1920s to 1970s, when social order was imposed by a conservative 
patriarchal system of family firms and the Catholic Church (Hylton 2007).  
 
One important component of the public policies enacted under the municipal 
administration of elected mayor Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) was a major program of 
capital investment in a number of informal settlements to create or improve public 
spaces, public libraries, new schools, social housing, support to microenterprises, 
cultural events, and recreation. These all point towards consolidating the presence of 
an until then absent local state, mainly through highly visible and attractive buildings 
that mark a stark contrast with the precariousness of self-built housing (Figure 1), and 
were the result of national and international architectural competitions. They also 
point towards making the city more readily attractive to international visitors and 
investors, in the hope that they may find some familiarity in the tropical exoticism of 
such a troubled city. 
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<Figure 1: Medellin Metrocable Line K with Park-Library España in the background 
Photo: Julio D Dávila> 
 
A highly visible element of these interventions are two cable-cars lines connecting 
low-income hilly communities with the city’s Metro system, the first of which was 
built by Fajardo’s predecessor as elected mayor. Despite their low passenger-carrying 
capacity (at 30,000 trips per day), they have improved mobility conditions within the 
catchment area of the stations and their use involve no additional cost for Metro users 
(Brand and Dávila 2011). They have also helped to physically integrate these 
settlements with the city center while making residents feel part of the rest of the city. 
Their success can be measured in the long queues that form at peak times, and in the 
fact that similar systems have been implemented in other Latin American cities such 
as Caracas and Rio de Janeiro (Figure 2). Aerial cable-cars could well become to hilly 
areas what Bus Rapid Transit Systems (BRTs) have been to main arterial roads in 
large and medium-sized cities around the world since Bogota launched its first line in 
2000 (Gilbert 2008).  
 
At the same time, to outsiders, including tourists, these lines have opened access to 
areas previously seen as dangerous. As youth gangs are still active in some of these 
areas and localized violence has not entirely disappeared, for some there is probably a 
certain thrill in experiencing these environments from the safe distance of a hovering 
cabin. Among local residents there is a palpable sense of relief and improvement, 
reflected in greater local investment in buildings and local businesses, as well as pride 
in receiving visitors. 
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<Figure 2: Rio de Janeiro’s aerial-cable car in Complexo de Alemão informal 
settlement -  Photo: Frédéric Monié> 
 
Another important element of the municipality’s policies is the implementation of a 
participatory budgeting process, whereby local communities make collective 
decisions on 5 per cent of the municipality’s investment capital. Although this may 
not seem like a large proportion, between 2004 and 2011 communities across the city 
made investment decisions on a total of USD350 million (Coupé, Brand and Dávila 
2013; Carvajal 2009). Participatory budgeting, a system developed originally in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil (Avritzer 2006; Peruzzotti and Selee 2009), was turned into a central 
strategy aimed at improving and strengthening the relationship between the local state 
and poor communities.  
 
We can now return to the notions of ‘good governance’ and ‘city performance’ as 
advocated by the World Bank: to what extent does the case of Medellin offer support 
to the argument that good governance and globalization tend to improve city 
performance, allowing cities to translate global opportunity into local value for their 
citizens (Léautier 2006)? 
 
Increased openness to the global economy was certainly at the core of mayor 
Fajardo’s policies in the mid-2000s: in his 286-page end of administration report, the 
word ‘competitive’ (as referred mostly to its citizens and its productive base) is cited 
32 times. He further concludes: ‘we promoted the city as a destination for foreign 
investment on the basis of competitive human talent, the quality and coverage of its 
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public utilities, a strong entrepreneurial tradition, competitive costs, and strategic 
clusters (garments, construction, energy, and business tourism)’ (Fajardo 2007: 17). 
His successor as mayor, Alfonso Salazar (2008-2011), went further and used the word 
in the title of his administration’s program: ‘Medellin: Solidarity and 
Competitiveness’. Excluding references to this title, the word competitive appears 26 
times in his 209-page end of administration report (Salazar 2011). Competitiveness is 
also central to the current administration of mayor Aníbal Gaviria (2012-2015), as 
shown in the urban development plan (Gaviria 2012), with 114 counts of the word in 
a 510-page document.  
 
There is no denying that Medellin’s local government has tried very hard, over the 
last decade, to follow the World Bank’s advice to open its economy to the world. The 
intention was to diversify the local economy away from manufacturing industry and 
towards the service sector. And the attraction of foreign private investment seems to 
have become a relevant issue not merely for the municipal government but also for 
the underground economy: a prominent Mafia boss linked to illegal drug trafficking 
and death squads argued in the mid-2000s that the city needed to attract foreign 
investment, lest the city ‘be left behind by the engine of globalization’ (Hylton 2007: 
86). 
 
To what extent has this seemingly frantic search for competitiveness and economic 
openness led to improvements as measured in terms of access and quality of services 
for its population? One way to find out is by comparing Medellin’s performance with 
that of other cities.  
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Comparisons with the World Bank’s study of a sample of 274 cities in developing 
countries quoted earlier (Léautier 2006) are revealing. They show that both in 1985 
and in 2011 coverage of basic services in the municipality of Medellin (excluding the 
other nine municipalities in the metropolitan area, of which Medellin is the richest, 
with 70 per cent of the total population) was higher than for the sample of non-OECD 
cities from around the world. In particular, in 2011 it was well above those considered 
in the World Bank sample to be ‘highly globalized’, with upwards of 98 per cent of its 
population having access to water and sewerage services, and 94 per cent to telephone 
services. Even making allowances for the decade that separates Medellin’s 2011 data 
from that for the sample of cities (dating to the late 1990s or early 2000s), the 
differences are considerable.  
 
Despite widespread poverty and a high incidence of urban informality in Medellin, 
coverage of basic infrastructure services was already among the highest in the sample 
in the mid-1980s. For decades, the city economy has relied almost entirely on local 
and regional resources, initially from mining and agriculture, and later from 
manufacturing, property and the financial sector. Municipal revenues have been 
bolstered by a well-managed property tax as well as a long-established betterment tax 
on infrastructure projects. The national government played a role in funding 
construction of key infrastructure projects, most notably the city’s Metro system, but 
by and large basic infrastructure has been built with local government revenues. 
 
As was seen earlier, by the mid-2000s local authorities were intent on opening up the 
city economy (largely to the financial and property sectors) and improve its 
competitiveness. Can improvements be attributed to these efforts? Official figures 
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show that the high levels of basic service coverage seen in 2011 had already been 
attained by the mid-2000s, so perhaps this was not a key factor. Furthermore, 
although measurements are elusive, it would seem that Medellin’s notorious 
international image weighed down these efforts considerably, though there are 
indications that investments in infrastructure, international events and marketing are 
paying off: the city’s position in Latin America as measured by an ‘index of attraction 
of investment’ (a composite of national and local factors including, among others, 
city’s reputation, quality of higher education, security, and local purchasing power) 
rose from 30 in 2010, to 25 in 2012 and to 13 in 2013 (Universidad del CEPEC-IdN 
2013). 
 
The question arises whether ‘good governance’ might then be responsible for the 
significant improvements in basic service coverage from the mid-1980s to the present. 
Are the high coverage rates in basic infrastructure services incompatible with the 
enormous social dislocation so pungently shown in the high homicide rates and levels 
violence of the 1990s? The answer is no, and lies partly in the strength and endurance 
of the municipality’s powerful institutions. Central to the implementation of the range 
of socially progressive policies outlined earlier, were three municipal institutions: the 
Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU - Urban Development Agency), the Metro 
Company, and the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Medellin (EPM - Public Utilities 
Company).  
 
With the EDU the municipality showed an extraordinary capacity for managing urban 
development projects. Created in 2002, this public enterprise unit brought together 
established technicians, young professionals and academics new to public 
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administration, a combination which allowed the fast implementation of novel ideas 
in short spans of time. Despite the large sums of local funds involved in these 
projects, a succession of municipal administrations not linked to traditional parties 
(e.g. both Fajardo and Salazar were elected independently of established political 
parties, a common rejection of party politics by urban voters in the 1990s and 2000s 
in Colombia) was instrumental in avoiding old clientelistic practices. 
 
Funding for these projects was also crucial. Since the 1990s, EPM has been 
increasingly central to the plans of any local government administration. With a 
current asset value of over USD10 billion, EPM is a municipality-owned public 
company providing water, sewerage, energy and communications services as well as 
20 per cent of Colombia’s electricity, with energy investments in other countries. It is 
the second largest company in Colombia after the national petroleum company 
(Ecopetrol), with an AAA national financial quality rating. In the three years between 
2010 and 2012, EPM transferred close to USD1.4 billion to the municipality, 
equivalent to USD500 for every inhabitant. The enterprise is committed by law to 
transferring no less than 30 per cent of its surplus to the municipality, thus providing 
it with a substantial investment resource, including for the range of social programs 
described earlier. It is able to do so by operating with a ruthless commercial logic, 
with illegal access to utility services being kept to a minimum. EPM spends over 
USD17 million per year in disconnecting and re-connecting users of infrastructure 
services who fail to pay their fares regularly (Restrepo, EPM CEO, personal 
communication 25 March 2011). 
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The Metro Company was created in 1982 as a public company owned equally by the 
municipality of Medellin and the government of Antioquia Province into whose 
municipalities one of its two main lines extends. The system opened its doors in 1996 
after eleven years of construction, demolition of large sections of the city center, and 
considerable financial over-runs. The first urban mass-transit system in Colombia, it 
set itself the role of transforming the city’s transport system, until then an inefficient 
mass of old and polluting buses competing for the same routes (Stienen 2009; Brand 
and Dávila 2011). Its main line connects the poor suburbs in the north to the city 
center and the southern suburbs, the historical location of factories. Following a 
protracted construction process it sought to counteract negative perceptions among 
the citizenship through a concerted marketing effort at promoting a ‘Metro Culture’ of 
strict behavioral rules that in many ways reflected the ‘Jesuit disciplinary system for 
which the city became famous during the 1930s and 1940s’ (Stienen 2009: 126).  
 
These efforts have paid off and successive mayors have found in the Metro Company 
a partner focused on functional autonomy and financial stability. These qualities can 
occasionally cause friction with the Medellín mayor’s office, for example in the 
selection of routes for a bus rapid transit system that it sees as generating competition 
(Brand and Dávila 2013). Nonetheless, there is no doubting its technical soundness, as 
seen in the fact that it has become a reference point in Latin America for the design of 
urban aerial cable-car lines, and it is held in high esteem by the city’s population 
despite having substantially increased ridership (to well over half a million users a 
day in 2012 involving heavy congestion at peak hours) and not subsidizing its fares 
(except to a few sections of the population such as low-income students and the 
elderly). 
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Of significance here is the fact that the political class has not been tempted to 
privatize EPM, a highly profitable company, nor the Metro, with the promise of large 
injections of cash, a temptation that many a local politician has fallen into in other 
contexts, both in Colombia and elsewhere (though at the time of writing sale of the 
telecommunications branch of EPM is being debated at the City Council). One 
explanation is that for several years both of these companies have had a very high 
standing in the opinion of Medellin’s citizens, while they serve well the interests of 
the dominant class. In this, the sense of pride that the average citizen feels for these 
institutions is shared by its elite, and draws on a strong sense of regional identity 
within Antioquia Province of which Medellin is the capital (Brand and Dávila 2013; 
Hylton 2007).  
 
CONCLUSIONS: IS MEDELLIN A CASE OF ‘GOOD URBAN GOVERNANCE’? 
The hegemonic discourse embodied in the ‘good urban governance’ debate has been 
highly influential in Latin America. This was much in evidence in the 1990s and early 
2000s with the proliferation of strategic city plans fostered by national and 
international consultants (mainly associated with the Barcelona and Bilbao models; 
see Cuadrado-Roura and Fernández Güell 2008), but also through the deployment of a 
fairly standard kit of strategies and other tools designed to attract domestic or 
international capital, tourists, and generally project an image of modernity to the 
outside world. This has involved a range of interventions including major urban 
renewal of brownfield sites mainly located close to city centers, ports, rivers or high-
income residential areas. In echoes of Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
model, this has meant relocation of entire low-income or socially marginal 
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communities and small businesses to less valuable sites, generally in the outskirts of 
cities, as well as large-scale investments in brand new corporate headquarters, 
convention centers, high-culture performance venues, hotels, and office buildings, all 
exhibiting a readily identifiable and often bland international architectural language of 
glass, steel and faux gardens. 
 
Nonetheless, according to the principles of ‘good governance’ outlined by the World 
Bank (2000), the range of interventions in informal settlements described here would 
appear to point towards making Medellin a more livable city. They would also appear 
to be contributing to making the city more competitive, given that they have helped 
integrate marginal areas to the rest of the city and to the city’s labor and service 
markets. The remarkable drops in the degrees of stigmatization previously 
experienced by the residents of the informal settlements served by the aerial cable-
cars (Coupé 2013) should enable them to integrate more easily into the city’s wider 
labor markets, while gaining access to a broad range of cultural and social activities. 
Insofar as transport projects such as the cable-car lines widen access to specialized 
training, it is conceivable that it also helps strengthen their human capital. These 
issues should not, of course, be seen in isolation from other municipal programs, as 
for example access to a range of university scholarships that the municipality 
earmarked specifically for young residents of these settlements. 
 
Finally, the range of interventions outlined here would point to strengthening the 
municipality’s bankability, insofar as they have sought to help workers access labor 
markets more easily and may lead them to eventually become tax payers. To what 
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extent this will result in higher degrees of formalization of both workers and 
residents, and therefore higher levels of income tax, remains to be seen.  
 
There is little doubt that the remarkable volume of highly visible investments in 
public space, social, cultural and transport infrastructure that Medellin has made in 
the past decade has helped forge an image of ‘good governance’ and ‘good 
management’, one that will probably attract national and international visitors and 
capital. To what extent this will help reduce factors that are not explicitly measured in 
the notion of ‘good governance’, such as high levels of inequality and spatial 
fragmentation, will depend on a concerted effort to sustain high levels of investment 
in the city’s poorer areas, reduce the high levels of violence that still make everyday 




Avritzer, L. (2006) ‘New public spheres in Brazil: Local democracy and deliberative 
politics’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(3): 623-637. 
 
Bahl, V. (2012) ‘Murder capital to modern miracle? The progression of governance in 
Medellin, Colombia’, DPU Working Paper No. 143, London: DPU, UCL. 
 
Bateman, M., Durán Ortiz, J. P. and Sinkovic, D. (2011) ‘Microfinance in Latin 
America: The case of Medellin, Colombia, in M. Bateman (ed) Confronting 
Microfinance: Undermining Sustainable Development, Boulder: Kumarian Press. 
 
  24 
Biel, R. (2000) The New Imperialism. Crisis and Contradictions in North/South 
Relations, London: Zed Books. 
 
Brand, P. (2005) Urban Environmentalism: Global Change and the Mediation of 
Local Conflict, London: Routledge. 
 
Brand, P. and Dávila, J. (2011) ‘Mobility innovation at the urban margins: Medellin's 
Metrocables’, City, 15(6): 647-661. 
 
Brenner, N. (2004) New State Spaces, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Brenner, N. (2009) ‘Open Questions on State Rescaling’, Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society, 2: 123-139.  
 
Bresser Pereira, L.C. (1999) ‘Reforma Estatal en los Noventa: Lógica y Mecanismos 
de Control’, in P. Miguel Gandour and L.B. Mejia G. (eds) Hacia el Rediseño del 
Estado, Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeación and Tercer Mundo Editores: 
3-54. 
 
Carvajal, Y. (2009) ‘Participación ciudadana y buen gobierno: El presupuesto 
participativo como aporte a la democratización de la ciudad de Medellín’, Foro, 68: 
105-114. 
 
CEPEC-IdN (2013) Ranking de Ciudades Latinoamericanas para la Atracción de 
Inversiones, Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario. 
  25 
 
Craig, D. and Porter, D. (2006) Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, 
Poverty Reduction and Political Economy, London: Routledge. 
 
Coupé, F. (2013) ‘The Metrocables: Risk, Poverty, and Inclusion’, in J.D. Dávila. 
(ed) Urban Mobility and Poverty: Lessons from Medellín and Soacha, Colombia, 
London: DPU-UCL and Universidad Nacional de Colombia: 59-71. 
 
Coupé, F., Brand, P. and Dávila, J.D. (2013) ‘Medellin: Institutional context and 
urban paradigm change’, in J.D. Dávila (ed) Urban Mobility and Poverty: Lessons 
from Medellín and Soacha, Colombia, London: DPU-UCL and Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia: 47-58. 
 
Cuadrado-Roura, J. R. and Fernández Güell, J. M. (2008) ‘Metropolitan areas and the 
challenges of competitiveness’, in E. Rojas, J. R. Cuadrado-Roura, and J. M. 
Fernández Güell (eds) Governing the Metropolis. Principles and Cases, Washington 
DC: Inter-American Development Bank: 25-76. 
 
Dávila, J. D. (2004) ‘La transformación de Bogotá’, in F. Cepeda (ed) Fortalezas de 
Colombia, Bogotá: Editorial Planeta: 417-439. 
 
Dávila, J. D. (ed) (2013) Urban Mobility and Poverty: Lessons from Medellín and 
Soacha, Colombia, London: DPU-UCL and Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
 
  26 
Fajardo, S. (2007) Informe Final de Gestión. Plan de Desarrollo 2004-2007, 
Medellin: Medellin’s Mayor’s Office. 
 
Gaviria, A. (2012) Medellin: Un Hogar para la Vida. Plan de Desarrollo 2012-2015, 
Medellin: Mayor’s Office. 
 
Gilbert, A. (2008) ‘Bus rapid transit: Is Transmilenio a miracle cure?’ Transport 
Reviews 28 (4): 439-467. 
 
Harvey, D. (1989) ‘From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in 
urban governance in late capitalism’, Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human 
Geography, 71(1): 3-17 
  
Hunt, D. (1989) Economic Theories of Development. An Analysis of Competing 
Paradigms, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Hylton, F. (2007) ‘Medellín’s makeover’, New Left Review, 44: 71-89.  
 
Kalmanovitz, S. (2001) Las Instituciones y el Desarrollo Económico en Colombia. 
Bogotá: Editorial Norma.  
 
Léautier, F. (2006) (ed) Cities in a Globalizing World. Governance, Performance & 
Sustainability, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
Maragall, P. (1997) Los Ayuntamientos, Barcelona: Ediciones Destino. 
  27 
 
Medellin-IDB (2009) Medellín: La Transformación de una Ciudad, Medellín: 
Mayor’s Office and Inter-American Development Bank.  
 
Mohan, G. Brown, E., Millward, B. and Zack-Williams, A. (1999) (eds) Structural 
Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts, London: Routledge. 
 
Rossi, U. and Vanolo, A. (2012) Urban Political Geographies. A Global Perspective, 
London: Sage. 
 
Peruzzotti, E. and Selee, A. (2009) ‘Participatory innovation and representative 
democracy in Latin America’, in E. Peruzzotti and A. Selee (eds) Participatory 
Innovation and Representative Democracy in Latin America, Washington DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press: 1-16. 
 
Sager, T. (2011) ‘Neo-liberal urban planning policies: A literature survey 1990-2010’, 
Progress in Planning, 76: 147-199. 
 
Salazar, A. (2011) Informe Final de Gestión. Plan de Desarrollo 2008-2011, 
Medellin: Medellin’s Mayor’s Office. 
 
Stienen, A. (2009) ‘Urban technology, conflict education, and disputed space’, 
Journal of Urban Technology, 16(2-3): 109-142. 
 
  28 
Swyngedouw, E. (2005) ‘Governance innovation and the citizen: The Janus face of 
governance beyond-the-state’, Urban Studies, 42: 1991-2006. 
 
Williamson, J. (2004) ‘A short history of the Washington Consensus’, Paper 
Commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for a Conference ‘From the Washington 
Consensus towards a new Global Governance’, Barcelona: September 24-25, 2004. 
 
Wall Street Journal (2013) ‘City of the year’, advertisement sponsored by Citi, WSJ 
Magazine, available: http://online.wsj.com/ad/cityoftheyear, accessed 20 April 2013. 
 
World Bank (1991) Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 
1990s, Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank (2000) Cities in Transition: World Bank Urban and Local Government 
Strategy, Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
Zetter, R. (2004) ‘Market enablement and the urban sector’, in R. Zetter and M. 
Hamza (eds.) Market Economy and Urban Change: Impacts in the Developing World, 
London: Earthscan: 1-40. 
